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Abstract
Incidental emotion can powerfully impact risky decision-making
processes, yet the specific mechanisms that drive this relationship require further
exploration. The appraisal theory of emotion suggests that emotional valence
alone cannot accurately predict an emotion’s effect on risk-taking. Rather,
specific appraisal dimensions of an emotional experience—particularly the
perception of control—have been found to critically influence risk-taking across
settings. Previous literature indicates that guilt, a negative emotion characterized
by high personal control, led to higher risk preferences. The current study sought
to replicate these findings and test whether a similar relationship would be found
for the positive emotion of pride. Data was collected from 152 participants who
were randomly assigned to pride induction, guilt induction, sadness induction, or
a neutral control condition. Risky decision-making was assessed using a gambling
task where participants were asked to choose either between guaranteed or risky
financial outcomes. It was hypothesized that both pride and guilt would lead to
higher risk-taking and that this relationship would be mediated by higher
perceptions of personal control; however, no significant differences in risk-taking
based on emotion condition were found. Study results confirmed unique appraisal
patterns for pride, guilt, and sadness, however, and suggest that other people may
have more agency in experiences of pride than previously assumed. Implications
for future research are discussed.
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Introduction
Imagine two men who have sat down at a table of roulette to enjoy an
evening of gambling and possible good fortune. Both have just come from a long
day at work and are ready to try their luck at a game of chance. The first is in a
buoyant mood, having been unexpectedly promoted earlier that day. The second
has just been fired. Knowing these facts, are we accurately able to predict whether
one person is more or less likely to place high, risky bets than the other? Will the
events of the day influence the men’s current behavior and, if so, how? Although
the answers to these questions remain complex, researchers agree that emotions
are often crucial to comprehending behavior. Even transient emotional
experiences—such as the joy elicited from a promotion or the anger of being laid
off—can impact the complex cognitions of decision making (Lerner, Li,
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). Although incidental emotion may involve even
affect that operates outside of an individual’s conscious awareness, it interacts
powerfully with integral emotion to guide judgments and alter behavior (Han,
Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Västfjäl et al., 2016). The current research investigated
more specifically whether incidental emotions rooted in perceptions of personal
control increase risky decision-making via emotional appraisals.
Emotion and Risk
Valence-based models. Affective experience exerts powerful influence
over information processing and is used as a tool to inform judgments (Schwarz
& Clore, 1981). The importance of emotion in decision-making increases when a
person believes their feelings are relevant to the current situation or when
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processing becomes more difficult due to distraction or cognitive load. The effect
is strengthened further when a person possesses a high level of trust in his or her
own feelings (Avnet, Pham, & Stephen, 2012). Traditionally, valence-based
models have prioritized the differences in an emotion’s degree of pleasantness as
the most critical dimension when comparing the influence of emotions on
decision-making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Consequently, it is assumed that the
effects of all positive emotions (e.g., joy, gratitude, and hope) should be relatively
similar to one another and significantly different from the effects of negative
emotions (e.g., anger, fear, and disgust).
Nevertheless, emotional valence alone cannot predict a single, consistent
behavioral outcome across contexts (Andrade & Cohen, 2007). Although people
in positive moods regularly predict greater positive outcomes from risky scenarios
and perceive less risk in the environment overall (and people in negative moods
consistently predict the opposite), this risk perception does not necessarily parallel
actual risk-taking behavior (Andrade & Cohen, 2007). It would be expected that
people who perceive fewer risks would engage in more risky choices, yet this has
not consistently been found as an effect of positive emotion. Competing theories
have been proposed as explanation. People experiencing negative affect may be
more drawn to risks, for example, because of the potential reward’s moodenhancing potential—or, they may be more averse to the consequences because
their negative emotional state highlights potential loss. Similarly, positive affect
may at times lead individuals to feel overconfident in risky scenarios, but when
the stakes rise and the potential consequences become more salient, some studies
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show that these individuals become more risk-averse than their negative-affect
counterparts (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Andrade & Cohen, 2007).
Contrary to one proposed explanation, Isen et al. (1988) did not find
evidence that the valence of an emotional experience enhanced the desirability of
possible rewards in risk-taking scenarios; perceived rewards were rated as equally
appealing by happy people, unhappy people, and the control group. However,
emotion induction did influence perceptions of consequences—those who were
happier perceived potential loss as more severe (i.e., people were protective of
their current positive affect). Isen et al.’s (1988) findings demonstrated that the
influence of incidental emotion on behavioral outcomes is context-dependent and
cannot be generalized based on valence alone; therefore, alternative models are
necessary. The appraisal theory of emotion offers a more utilitarian framework to
investigate when and why specific emotions impact judgments and decisionmaking (Lerner et al., 2015).
Appraisal theory of emotion. The appraisal theory of emotion
distinguishes between discrete affective experiences by viewing emotional
processes as “adaptive responses which reflect appraisals of features of the
environment” (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013, p. 119). Although
valence is incorporated into this model, it is not the only significant factor.
Emotions are based on a perception of the person-environment relationship and
are elicited by a unique combination of characteristics that are most commonly
defined along multiple dimensions, including pleasantness, agency, level of
certainty, attentional activity, anticipated effort, novelty, and personal control
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(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Moors et al., 2013). Surprise, for example, is elicited
by a combination of appraisals that score highly in pleasantness and novelty; low
in certainty, agency, and personal responsibility; and medium in attentional
activity and anticipated effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Each appraisal pattern
is also assumed to result in specific motivations and action tendencies, such as
approach or avoidance. Appraisal theory consequently provides a flexible
framework to understand the processes of emotion and explains how an identical
situation can lead to unique emotional responses between individuals.
Previous research has proposed that emotional experiences can impact
perception, decision-making, and risk-taking differentially via specific appraisals.
Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), for example, explored how the induction of
incidental emotion (in this case, either anger, guilt, gratitude, or pride) affected a
person’s rating of an acquaintance’s trustworthiness. Based on traditional valencecentric models, the authors hypothesized that inducing negative incidental
emotion would reduce a participant’s perception of an acquaintance’s
trustworthiness whereas positive incidental emotion would increase it. Findings
only partially supported this hypothesis, as gratitude led to the highest level of
perceived trustworthiness and anger produced the lowest level, but there was no
significant difference between guilt and pride. When results were reinterpreted
through the appraisal theory framework, however, it revealed a relationship
between an emotion’s non-valence dimensions and the magnitude of the
emotion’s effect on perceived trustworthiness. Although valence was important
for predicting the general direction of the effect (positive vs. negative),

6

participants’ judgments were impacted to a greater degree when induced with an
emotion characterized by an appraisal of other-control (e.g., gratitude and anger)
versus personal control (e.g., pride and guilt). Pride and guilt only slightly
impacted perceptions of trustworthiness, whereas anger and gratitude
demonstrated much more dramatic effects.
Within risk-taking literature specifically, research is moving beyond
predicting differences between groups of negative and positive emotions and is
instead focusing on discriminating successfully between the effects of emotions
that possess the same valence. In an investigation of incidental fear and anger,
Lerner et al. (2015) observed that the differences in specific dimensions between
these two negative emotions are manifested through unique “depths of processing,
brain hemispheric activation, facial expressions, autonomic responses, and central
nervous system activity” (p. 804). It is therefore simplistic to assume fear and
anger will have the same cognitive effects simply because they share a high
negative valence. More notably, fear and anger differ in their associated degree
of certainty and personal control, which relates significantly with risk perception.
Whereas fear is rooted in the appraisal of the environment as highly unpredictable
and uncontrollable, anger involves the opposite response and perceives something
or someone outside the self as the causal agent for the emotion-inducing event
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lu et al., 2013). Anger, but not fear, has consistently
been found to reduce the perception of risk, a phenomenon believed to be
influenced primarily by these dimensions of certainty and individual control (Lu
et al., 2013).
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In a series of three studies, Lu et al. (2013) expanded this research
question by empirically isolating the effects of specific appraisals on perceived
driving risk. First, participants read a vignette about driving that was designed to
elicit either fear or anger. They were then given an additional paragraph with
details that prompted them to reappraise the scenario with either strengthened or
inhibited perceptions of their own certainty, control, or responsibility. Since fear
is associated with low levels of certainty and anger with high levels of certainty,
participants in the fear condition read details intended to heighten their sense of
certainty and participants in the anger condition read details that reduced
certainty. Participants were then asked to rate their level of driving risk perception
immediately afterwards. The authors hypothesized that if appraisals were key to
understanding an emotion’s effect on risk perception, then by manipulating
appraisals alone, the differences between emotion conditions would be reduced.
Results strongly supported this hypothesis and, in fact, successfully eliminated
differences in risk perception between fear and anger by altering only their
associated appraisals in certainty, control, and responsibility. Although Lu et al.’s
(2013) research did not attempt to apply these findings beyond risk perception to
risk-taking behavior, initial results by other researchers support the importance of
appraisals in facilitating these decision-making processes. Studies have found, for
example, that anger leads participants to make riskier choices in economic games,
a phenomenon attributed to the impact of high certainty and control appraisals
(Beisswingert, Zhang, Goetz, Fang, & Fischbacher, 2015).
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The Importance of Control
Need for perception of control. Individual control is an important
appraisal dimension within emotion literature, but it has also been extensively
investigated within literature related to the self. Many researchers have argued
that a perception of control over the self and the environment is a universal human
need (Bandura, 1977) and is particularly significant because it critically
influences a person’s motivation to pursue and achieve meaningful goals
(Ferguson & Goodwin, 2010). Ferguson and Goodwin (2010) found that
perceptions of high control were correlated with subjective well-being and
meaning in life, particularly in aging populations. The strength of a person’s need
for control is influenced by a variety of individual and contextual variables, and
the predisposition to view oneself as a causal agent can be impacted by factors
such as age, mindset, levels of self-esteem, attributional style, locus of control,
affective experience, and the desirability of control in a given situation (Ferguson
& Goodwin, 2010; Novović, Kovač, Durić, & Biro, 2012). Novović et al. (2012),
for example, found that positive affect in healthy subjects was related to higher
perceptions of control, whereas clinical depression was associated with inhibited
perceptions of control. Similarly, individuals who possess social power
demonstrate estimations of personal control that extend beyond realistic
boundaries (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009).
Interestingly, motivation also significantly influences a person’s
perception of control. Biner and Hua (1995) conducted a clever investigation that
demonstrated that people’s confidence in their ability to control a game of chance

9

increased when their need for the game’s rewards were higher. When offered a
food reward, hungry participants were more likely to overestimate their individual
control over a chance-based game of cards than satiated participants. A similar
relationship was found when individuals were motivated to avoid an adverse
consequence of losing (e.g., speaking in front of a large audience or having a hand
submerged in icy water). Remarkably, even when adverse consequences were
present, participants in one study willingly reduced their statistical probability of
winning a game of roulette for the right to exercise the mere illusion of control
(e.g., pulling a lever versus allowing a random selection of the lottery) (Friedland,
Keinan, & Regev, 1992). More recent research has identified the consistent
mediating role of skill perception in the relationship between need and estimates
of personal control. Participants who are highly motivated to win erroneously
attribute more skill to chance-based games than exists (Biner, Johnston, Summers,
& Chudzynski, 2009). These studies indicate that control is intricately linked to
both internal states and the environmental context, which in certain cases may
even contribute to perceptions of control that extend beyond realistic boundaries.
Illusory control. Despite the importance of personal control within daily
life, most people do not accurately estimate their level of control over the
environment (Gino, Sharek, & Moore, 2011). Although newer lines of exploration
have revealed a phenomenon where people underestimate their control during
situations of high-controllability (e.g., stopping a moving vehicle by pressing the
brake; Gino et al., 2011), more commonly studies have supported the human
tendency to overestimate personal control when actual control is low. An
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unfounded perception of control is referred to as illusory control, which Langer
defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher
than the objective probability would warrant” (1975, p. 313). Although illusory
control is closely related to other ego-centric biases such as overconfidence and
unrealistic optimism, it remains conceptually distinct. Whereas unrealistic
optimism reflects more generalized beliefs about the likelihood of positive
outcomes, illusory control reflects people’s own certainty that they are the source
of a specific outcome (Fellner, 2004; McKenna, 1993) According to Langer
(1975), illusory control is fostered in environments with characteristics that are
also commonly found in skill-related scenarios (e.g., active involvement, personal
choice, task familiarity, stimulus familiarity, competition), which facilitate the
misattribution of outcomes to personal control.
Psychologists frequently consider illusory control to be an adaptive
mechanism as it serves to reduce stress and uncertainty and can motivate
constructive behaviors in the face of challenging circumstances. Control can be
either primary (external control over a specific situation or outcome) or secondary
(internal control over one’s response to a situation) (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995).
Through a qualitative study of women diagnosed with breast cancer, Taylor
(1983) concluded that believing one had some level of control (whether primary
or secondary) over an uncontrollable situation such as a cancer diagnosis served
as an important meaning-making mechanism. The belief that one could influence
future outcomes (i.e., cancer recurrence) by changing one’s behavior facilitated
subjective well-being even if the belief was not valid. Remarkably, the women’s
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sense of control over the environment proved to be highly resilient to
contradiction—if their illusory control was shattered in one domain (e.g., “I
cannot control whether the cancer comes back”), they simply switched their target
of control to a separate, often secondary, area of control (e.g., “I can control how I
respond to the cancer treatments”). These results suggest that cognitive illusions
play a critical role in supporting psychological functioning, especially within
situations that threaten the self.
Perception of control and risk. Evidence also indicates that the
perception of control may be particularly instrumental in risky decision-making
processes. In general, perceptions of control contribute to one’s ability to maintain
a positive self-presentation to others and high personal self-esteem—a quality
especially relevant to decisions that involve consequences. For example,
compulsive gamblers who regularly engage in high-stakes games of chance may
be more highly motivated to preserve strong illusory control over gambling
outcomes as a self-protective mechanism (Cowley, Briley, & Farrell, 2015).
Although illusory control may encourage gamblers to sustain damaging habits
that can be devastating over time, in the short term this strategy protects the ego
by affirming the self and justifying the person’s behavioral choices. As illusory
control can facilitate self-justification within any decision-making scenario that
involves risk, it remains an important mechanism to consider when investigating
the factors that lead people to make risky choices.
Control over risk can be conceptually broken down into two categories:
perception of control over exposure to the risk and perception of control over
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outcomes (Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007). Gambling literature
strongly confirms a positive relationship between the latter aspect of control and
risk-taking within game settings. Dixon (2000) found that participants gambled
with more chips in a game of roulette when they could control the chip placement
rather than when someone else placed the chips. More interestingly, illusory
control was reinforced by the participants’ selective memory recall; participants
regularly overestimated the number of wins received when they selected the chip
placement versus the experimenter placement. Martinez, Le Floch, Gaffié, and
Villejoubert (2011) also demonstrated that perceiving high levels of personal
control during the chance-driven game of French roulette significantly predicted
higher bets and a faster response time in placing bets.
Researchers such as Rockloff and Dyer (2007) have also confirmed a
positive relationship between the knowledge that another person has previously
won at a gambling game and riskier betting behavior; Martinez et al. (2011) more
recently demonstrated that illusory perceptions of control over the outcome
mediated this relationship. When no detailed information was given, participants
consistently misinterpreted the previous player’s success as indicative of skill, but
when the success was framed as an outcome due to chance, the mere knowledge
of success did not inflate perceptions of control or risk-taking behavior. Even
overhearing another player’s misattribution of skill at a video lottery (e.g., “I have
a feeling you’re due now!”) versus an accurate declaration (e.g., “It is chance that
determines the results!”) led gamblers to take more risks (Caron & Ladouceur,
2003, p. 191). Overall, the literature suggests that people tend to form overly
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liberal rather than overly conservative estimates of the importance of skill in
predicting gambling outcomes. As a result, gamblers sustain an unrealistic sense
of control over their chance of winning and may make increasingly risky
decisions.
Interestingly, misattributing the cause and effects of personal control is not
a phenomenon limited to the domain of gambling. Langens (2007) discovered that
when individuals receive ambiguous feedback on their performance after failing
at an unsolvable word problem, those exhibiting high illusory control displayed
more positivity and more persistence than those who scored low in illusory
control. Rather than attributing the failure to the self, ambiguous feedback
allowed individuals to reinterpret the failure as a result of external conditions. The
author’s conclusion—that illusory control can shield the ego and serve as an
effective emotional buffer—holds interesting implications for risky decision
making in both gambling scenarios and elsewhere. For the average person, failure
feedback may serve as a helpful warning sign to conserve resources and protect
themselves from incurring greater loss; however, those with high perceptions of
control who can also reinterpret their failure experience may ultimately choose to
make riskier choices.
As demonstrated by the findings on gambling and failure feedback,
illusory control can often be disadvantageous. Furthermore, an investigation of
the role of illusory control within business settings found that it led to lower
quality decision making by restricting the number of options entrepreneurs chose
to explore (Carr & Blettner, 2010). The relationship between illusory control and
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low-quality decision making was strongest when the individuals were highly
experienced and under high levels of stress; the combination of these factors
enhanced their cognitive bias by encouraging decision-makers to neglect possible
adverse outcomes and to rely excessively on previous successes. Other research
within the same domain reinforced these findings and showed that inexperienced
entrepreneurs with high illusory control also self-selected riskier investment
portfolios because they failed to diversity across a wider range of options (Fellner,
2004). Even among the general population, illusory control can directly result in
greater risk-taking behavior, as demonstrated by people’s willingness to endorse
more dangerous driving speeds when they are the driver rather than the passenger
(Horswill & McKenna, 1999). Together, these studies indicate that strong
perceptions of control may inevitably expose people to greater potential losses
both physically and financially. Consequently, the direct and indirect effects of
illusory control should be considered an important variable in decision-making
research.
The Case Study of Guilt
Researchers Kouchaki, Oveis, and Gino (2014) designed a series of
studies to test the relationship between incidental emotional experiences,
perceived sense of control, and the inclination to make risky judgments. The
studies focused on guilt, a negative emotion characterized by strong levels of
personal control. While not typically conceptualized along this appraisal
dimension, guilt is fundamentally rooted in a sense of individual control over the
environment—an experience of guilt would fail to be induced if a person did not
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believe that their behavior had directly resulted in a negative outcome for which
he or she was personally responsible. Kouchaki et al. (2014) found that when
participants were primed with guilt versus a neutral control condition, they
estimated that they would experience significantly fewer negative life events and
more positive events. They also preferred riskier choices when asked to choose
between either a small but guaranteed amount of money or the chance to win a
large amount of money. In subsequent studies, Kouchaki et al. (2014) empirically
demonstrated that priming guilt increased participants’ perceptions of illusory
control over difficult-to-control situations; additionally, negative affect was
eliminated as a possible mediator between guilt and risk taking. By utilizing a
variety of manipulations to prime guilt and assess risk preferences, Kouchaki et
al. (2014) successfully demonstrated that the appraisal of control mediated the
relationship between guilt and risk-taking and confirmed that the observed effects
were robust.
Rationale
The current study built upon the research conducted by Kouchaki et al.
(2014) on the relationship between emotions characterized by strong appraisals of
control and an increased preference for risky decisions. Previous studies found
that other negative emotions high in individual control, such as anger, can also
lead to an increase in risk taking. No current research, however, has explored
whether positive-valence emotions characterized by strong control appraisals
would demonstrate a similar relationship. The emotion of pride provided an
excellent point for comparison with guilt as it is characterized by very similar
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appraisals. Pride is defined as “a positive, self-conscious emotion arising from
achievements that can be attributed to one’s abilities or efforts” (Williams &
DeSteno, 2008, p. 1007). More broadly, self-conscious emotions such as pride
and guilt are generated when individuals judge an event to be 1) relevant to their
goal, 2) either congruent or incongruent with their goal, and 3) attributable to their
internal self rather than the external environment (Hofman & Fisher, 2012).
Because the event is attributable to the internal self, individuals feeling pride or
guilt experience a high degree of personal responsibility (Lerner et al., 2015).
Using the appraisal dimension framework, Smith and Ellsworth (1985)
categorized both pride and guilt as social emotions involving relatively high
levels of certainty and personal control. The two emotions vary primarily along
the dimension of pleasantness, although pride also reflects less anticipated mental
and physical effort than guilt.
The connection between pride and its related dimension of control has
been measured both directly by appraisal theorists such as Ellsworth and Smith
(1988) and indirectly by other researchers. Williams and DeSteno (2008), for
example, demonstrated that authentic pride (i.e., pride that originates in a specific
event or success) motivated greater perseverance on a challenging experimental
task. This finding can be considered antithetical to examples of learned
helplessness where subjects cease their attempts to control the environment; in
contrast to control subjects, prideful subjects continued interacting with their
environment to achieve a goal. Hypothetically, these subjects’ previous
experience (which led to feelings of pride) motivated them to persist because it

17

was a readily available example of their ability to successfully impact external
outcomes.
The current study sought to continue the empirical investigation of the
relationship between incidental emotion, appraisals, and decision-making. First,
we intended to replicate previous findings on the effects of guilt on risky
decision-making and second, we investigated the effects of pride within the same
paradigm. The present study also expanded the experimental design to include
additional measures of illusory control and risk-taking not included in the original
research, to provide further evidence of the robust nature of the relationship
between control appraisals and risk taking. Results of this study will help
illuminate the extent to which valence and control appraisals contribute to
decision-making in the context of risky choices. Although early emotion research
presented valence-centric models as the best framework for understanding
emotional influence on behavior, appraisal theorists contended that researchers
have traditionally underestimated the complex influence of other factors (e.g., the
situation’s level of novelty, anticipated effort, attentional activity, certainty, and
personal control). Through the systematic investigation of individual appraisals,
we can better understand how each component informs the decision-making
process and more accurately predict the combination of factors that enhances a
person’s inclination to take risks.
Statement of Hypotheses
Given the earlier findings by Kouchaki et al. (2014) and Ellsworth and
Smith’s (1988) identification of appraisal dimensions, we hypothesized that
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incidental emotions characterized by high levels of personal control would lead to
greater risky decision-making when compared to both a neutral emotion condition
(the control group) and a low-control emotion (i.e., sadness). These two
conditions served as control groups.

Hypothesis I: In comparison to both the control group and the sadness
condition, individuals experiencing guilt will demonstrate (Ia) greater
perceptions of control and (Ib) higher risk-taking.

Hypothesis II: In comparison to both the control group and the sadness
condition, individuals experiencing pride will demonstrate (IIa) greater
perceptions of control and (IIb) higher risk-taking.

Hypothesis III: Greater perceptions of control will mediate the relationship
between guilt and higher risk-taking.

Hypothesis IV: Greater perceptions of control will mediate the relationship
between pride and higher risk-taking.

Hypothesis V: There will be no significant difference in risk-taking
between pride and guilt conditions.
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Within Kouchaki et al.s’ (2014) original experimental paradigm, risktaking was assessed by asking participants to choose between financial options
that were framed in terms of possible gains (e.g., “Do you want a 50% chance of
getting $800 OR $100 for sure?”) No questions were framed in terms of loss (e.g.,
“Do you want a 50% of losing your $800 OR lose $100 for sure?”). Yet people do
not perceive a scenario phrased in terms of loss the same way they perceive an
identical situation phrased in terms of gain. Research has consistently supported
the presence of a “framing effect” where people exhibit a strong desire to avoid
any sure loss, regardless of its size. As a result, they are much more likely to
gamble (risking greater potential loss) for the chance to keep everything (Lewis,
2016). Other research further suggested that affect can influence risk-seeking and
risk-aversion differentially depending on whether the risky choice was framed in
terms of loss or gain (Cheung & Mikels, 2011); therefore, the current research
included both gain-frames and loss-frames in its measure of risk. However, it was
unknown what effects framing might have on decision-making in this context.

Research Question: How will guilt, pride, and sadness affect an individual’s risky
decision making in trials where choices are framed in terms of loss versus gain?

Method
Research Participants
Participants included 152 undergraduate students at a large, public
Midwestern university. Participants were recruited from introductory psychology
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courses through the university’s participant pool and received 1 hour of academic
credit as compensation for participation. Slightly under half of the sample (46%)
were first year students, with a mean age of approximately 20 years. Participants
were 68% female. Participants were roughly 53% Caucasian, 21% Latinx, 14%
Black, 8% Asian, 2% Pacific Islander/American Indian. Three participants were
removed due to non-compliance with the risk task instructions, for a total sample
size of 149 participants.
Procedure
The current study compared four conditions: guilt induction, pride
induction, sadness induction, and a neutral emotion condition. Upon arriving at
the research computer lab, participants were randomly assigned through Qualtrics
to one of the four conditions upon arriving at the research computer lab and were
told they would engage in a series tasks related to personal beliefs and decisionmaking (see Appendix A). First, participants completed the emotion induction
exercise. They then completed a series of appraisal-related questions reporting
their perception of the emotional event they described during the exercise. They
continued by responding to the illusory control items and completing a number
guessing game designed to assess perceptions of personal control. Lastly, they
participated in a risk-taking gambling task and responded to basic demographic
questions. To ensure that participants remained engaged throughout the game
tasks, they were told they would have the opportunity to enter a drawing for a
Starbucks gift card based on their performance in the games.
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Materials
Emotion induction. To induce the emotions of pride, guilt, and sadness,
participants were asked to recall a time when they experienced their assigned
emotion and compose a written response to the prompt (see Appendix B). For
example, the pride induction was as follows:
“Please describe a time in your personal life where you behaved in a way
that made you feel pride. Please describe the details about this situation
that made you feel pride. What was it like to be in this situation? What
thoughts and feelings did you experience? Describe the situation and any
thoughts or feelings you experienced. Please proving as many details as
possible so that a person reading your entry would understand the situation
and how you felt.”
The guilt and sadness inductions used identical narrative structures with the
appropriate emotion words replaced. In the control condition, participants were
asked simply to describe a typical day. To ensure that the intensity of the
emotional events were balanced across conditions, participants were then asked to
report on a 7-point scale the extent to which they had experienced sadness, guilt,
and pride in the event they wrote about (see Appendix C). Participants also
indicated through Likert-scale questions the extent to which they felt that 1) the
event was pleasant, 2) they were personally responsible for causing the situation
that happened, 3) someone other than themselves had caused the situation to
happen, 4) chance or circumstance caused the situation to happen, 5) they could
control what was happening, and 6) the situation required them to exert mental or
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physical effort. Responses were used to assess whether the emotion induction task
had induced the expected appraisal patterns for each emotion condition.
Illusory control measures.
Illusory control scale. The following series of questions were used
previously in similar studies as a measure of illusory control (Kouchaki et al.,
2014; Fast et al., 2009). Participants were asked to indicate their level of
perceived control over five items that were generally considered beyond the
control of any single individual (see Appendix D). Responses were rated on a
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”). Sample items included, “To what
extent will our country look different in the future because of you?”, “To what
extent are you able to have some control over the economy?”, and “To what
extent can you influence politicians?” A new survey item on environmental
practice (“To what extent are you able to influence the environment by engaging
in sustainable practices?”) replaced a previous question on an individual’s ability
to influence presidential elections. The revised scale demonstrated strong
reliability (α = .803).
Number guessing game. Next, participants received instructions on how
to play a short gambling game which served as a second measure of illusory
control (see Appendix E). Participants were told that the computer would
randomly select a number between 1 and 100 and they would have five
opportunities to choose the selected number. Prior to beginning, they were asked
to rate on a scale, "How confident are you that you will win the number guessing
game?" (1 = “not at all”; 7 = “very much”). Higher values on this question
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indicated higher perceptions of personal control. Participants then typed their five
guesses into the computer textbox but were not be told whether they correctly
guessed the number until the end of the experiment.
Framed Gambling Task. Risk-taking (see Appendix F and G) was
assessed using the manipulation designed by De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour,
and Dolan (2006). The gambling task consisted of 32 computerized trials. On
each trial, participants were given a sum of money (either $25, $50, $75, or $100)
and were asked to choose either a guaranteed option (lose or keep certain amount
for sure) or a risky option (gamble on set probability of retaining the original full
amount). For example, if the participant was given $25, they might be asked
whether they would prefer to keep $15 and lose $10 (the sure option) or gamble
with an 80% chance of keeping all $25. The probability of the gamble alternated
between 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80%. In addition, trials alternated between questions
where the choice was framed as a gain (e.g., “keep $15”) versus a loss (e.g., “lose
$10”). Throughout the trials, the expected value of the outcomes for each choice
remained identical.
Results
Manipulation Checks
To evaluate whether the emotion induction exercise successfully resulted
in difference emotional experiences, participants’ self-reported levels of guilt,
pride, and sadness were analyzed (see Tables 5-7 for post-hoc results). Results of
a MANOVA, F(3, 145) = 54.05, p < .001, Wilk's Λ = .119, followed by a Tukey
post-hoc analysis, indicated that participants reported the greatest level of pride
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(M = 6.37, SD = 1.32) in the pride condition, F(3, 145) = 116.014, p < .001, η2 =
.508. Participants experienced the greatest guilt in the guilt condition (M = 6.34,
SD = .94), although the sadness condition reported the second highest level of
guilt (M = 4.31, SD = 2.04), F(3, 145) = 78.48, p < .001, η2= .619. Participants
reported the greatest degree of sadness in the sadness condition (M = 6.36, SD =
0.93), although the guilt condition also indicated high levels of sadness (M = 5.29,
SD = 1.47), F(3, 145) = 86.32, p < .001, η2 = .641. There was no difference,
however, between conditions in the reported intensity of the target emotion (i.e.,
guilt in the guilt condition, pride in the pride condition, and sadness in the sadness
condition), F(2, 109) = .005, p = .995. These results indicated that the emotion
induction task was successful, and the three conditions were comparable in
emotional intensity.
Because the appraisal of personal control was predicted to be a variable
integral to the current research question, it was important that the groups selected
for comparison (i.e., sadness and the neutral condition) differed from guilt and
pride. As a manipulation check, a one-way ANOVA, F(3, 145) = 8.56, p < .001,
η2=.150, compared the pride, guilt, sadness, and neutral conditions on the
question, “In the event you described, to what extent did you feel you could
control what was happening?” Concurrent with theory-based predictions, people
recalling events related to pride and guilt did not differ in their reported level of
personal control over the emotion-inducing event (Mpride = 4.74, SDpride = 1.96 vs.
Mguilt = 5.09, SDguilt = 1.99), but both conditions reported much higher levels of
perceived control than the sadness condition (M = 3.44, SD = 2.11).
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Unexpectedly, participants in the control condition also reported high levels of
personal control (M = 5.54, SD =1.52) that were not significantly different than
the guilt and pride conditions, indicating that the neutral emotion condition in this
specific study was an inappropriate choice for comparison as it was not neutral in
terms of personal control appraisals. Participants in the neutral condition were
subsequently removed from the data set for the next analyses, reducing the sample
size to 112 subjects.
Appraisal Patterns
The three emotion conditions (pride, guilt, and sadness) were compared on
the following six appraisal dimensions: pleasantness, agency of self, agency of
others, agency of circumstances or chance, personal control, and anticipated
mental or physical effort. All appraisals were rated on a 7-point scale. Results of a
MANOVA, F(2, 109) = 18.70, p < .001, Wilk's Λ = .231, η2 = .519, and
subsequent Tukey post-hoc tests (see Tables 8-13) indicated the following:
Pride events (M = 5.76, SD = 1.53) were rated as significantly more
pleasant than sadness (M = 1.64, SD = 1.35) or guilt events (M = 1.97, SD = 1.25),
F(2, 109) = 103.59, p < .001, η2 = .655. Both pride (M = 5.34, SD = 1.99) and
guilt (M = 6.14, SD = 1.38) events were ascribed relatively high levels of selfagency, but only guilt was found to be significantly higher than sadness events (M
= 4.54, SD = 2.10), F(2, 109) = 6.844, p < .01, η2 = .112.. Pride events (M = 4.42,
SD = 2.06) were also reported to have significantly higher attributions of othersagency than guilt (M = 2.66, SD = 1.47), though the difference between the pride
and sadness condition (M = 3.59, SD = 2.12) did not reach statistical significance
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(p = .116), F(2, 109) = 7.68, p < .01, η2 =.123. There were no significant
differences (p = .087) in perceived agency of chance between pride (M = 3.05, SD
= 1.82), guilt (M = 3.83, SD = 2.11), or sadness (M = 4.15, SD = 2.28), F(2, 109)
= 2.84, p > .05, η2 =.05. Pride events were perceived as requiring significantly
greater levels of anticipated effort (M = 5.95, SD = 1.59, p < .05) than the guilt (M
= 4.91, SD = 1.84) or sadness conditions (M = 4.90, SD = 2.01), F(2, 109) = 4.10,
p < .05, η2 =.07.
Control and Risk-Taking
To test Hypothesis Ia and IIa, a one-way ANOVA evaluated whether there
were any differences in illusory control (using the mean of the five Likert-scale
questions) between emotion conditions (see Table 14 for means). No significant
difference was found, F(2, 109) = .080, p = .923. A second ANOVA was run to
determine whether participants differed in their level of confidence in being able
to correctly guess a computer-generated number (the second measure of illusory
control), but no differences were found based on emotion condition F(2, 109) =
.546, p = .581. Overall, means were very low for this measure, between 2.74 and
3.09 on a 7-point scale.
To test Hypothesis Ib and IIb, risk-taking behavior in the gambling task
was assessed, using the total percentage of the gambles selected (out of 32 total
trials) as the dependent variable (see Table 15). A one-way ANOVA revealed no
significant differences in gambling between the pride (M = .56, SD = .15), guilt
(M = .59, SD =.17), and sadness conditions (M = .53, SD = .17), F(2, 109) = 1.11,
p = .333). As Hypothesis I and II were not supported, analyses were not run to test
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Hypothesis III and IV. Hypothesis V, which predicted no differences between the
pride and guilt conditions in terms of perceived control and risk-taking, was
supported by the results.
As an additional exploratory research question, group gambling
differences based on framing effects were tested. There was a strong framing
effect overall, with people gambling significantly more in the loss frames (M =
.65, SD = .19) than the gain frames (M = .48, SD = .19), F(1, 111) = 83.89, p <
.001. However, there was no significant interaction between framing and emotion
conditions, F(2, 109) = .870, p = .422.
Discussion
Incidental emotions often serve as powerful facilitators or inhibitors for
risky decision-making, although the specific factors underlying these cognitive
processes are still debated. The appraisal theory of emotion, which describes
emotions as responses to specific environmental information, provides a flexible
framework to explore the nuanced effects of emotion on risk-taking. By
considering multiple dimensions of the emotional experience, such as
pleasantness, agency, level of certainty, attentional activity, anticipated effort,
novelty, and personal control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Moors et al., 2013),
researchers have successfully identified relationships between specific appraisals
and risk-taking. Appraising the environment as being highly certain and within
one’s control, for example—which occurs when people experience the emotion of
anger but not fear—leads people to take more risks (Lu et al., 2013).
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The current research builds upon these previous findings to further explore
the relationship between appraisals of personal control and risk-taking. Utilizing
a paradigm very similar to the Kouchaki et al. (2014) study, this study
investigated whether incidental experiences of pride and guilt (emotions
characterized by strong appraisals of personal control) would lead to greater risky
decision-making. Although it was hypothesized that people experiencing guilt and
pride would take more risks that people who experienced sadness (an emotion
characterized by low appraisals of personal control) or a neutral emotion
condition, there were no differences in risk-taking based on emotion condition.
This finding held true across both gain- and loss-framed gambling trials,
indicating that the emotion condition did not interact with framing to make
gambling more likely under certain combinations of conditions. Though the
pattern of means did consistently fall in the predicted direction, with guilt leading
to the highest percentage of gambling and sadness the lowest, these differences
were marginal and non-significant. Furthermore, the neutral emotion condition
was removed from analysis as it was found that the typical “neutral” writing
prompt used in emotion induction manipulations did not generate an experience
that was neutral in terms of control appraisals. The study failed to replicate the
Kouchaki et al. (2014) findings on guilt and did not provide evidence to
substantiate the role of perceived personal control on risk-taking.
Expanding the findings of this study beyond risk-taking, the responses to
the appraisal-related questions within each emotion condition contribute to our
understanding of the appraisal patterns specific to guilt, pride, and sadness
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experiences. As Smith and Ellsworth (1985) also found in their initial
investigation, this study confirmed that guilt was characterized by low appraisals
of pleasantness, high appraisals of self-agency, and medium-high levels of
personal control and anticipated effort. Sadness, in contrast, involved low
appraisals of pleasantness, low levels of anticipated effort, moderate levels of
chance-based agency, and moderate levels of others-agency; although it was
expected that sadness would score lower on self-agency than was the case. Pride
was characterized by a high degree of pleasantness, self-agency, and personal
control but also, surprisingly, was described as having high levels of anticipated
effort and others-agency. As predicted, pride and guilt held very similar appraisal
patterns across most dimensions; however, it was unanticipated that the two
would differ in agency appraisals. Despite perceiving the self as having high
levels of personal agency and control in the situations they recalled, people in the
pride condition simultaneously perceived other people as having a high level of
responsibility over pride-inducing events. These findings contribute to appraisalrelated literature by providing new evidence that other people may play a more
significant role in pride experiences than previously assumed.
Limitations and Future Research
The current investigation of emotion and risk-taking was limited in its use
of an emotion induction technique that could not control for variations in
individual experience. Because participants could choose which emotional event
in their lives to write about, the experiences they recalled varied in terms of
recency, intensity, attributions, and emotional purity. Participants within the guilt
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and sadness conditions, for example, often recalled an event that induced
simultaneous feelings of guilt and sadness, creating a mixed emotional experience
that may have led to different effects than a purer experience of guilt or sadness.
Similarly, despite being specifically instructed to recall instances in which they
had performed an action that led them to feel pride (e.g., studying hard and
getting an A on a test), some participants reported an event where they played no
personal role and the pride-inducing action was performed by someone else (e.g.,
the Cubs winning the World Series in 2016).
Though the autobiographical memory recall task is one of the most
popularly used emotion induction techniques, qualitative text analyses of the
content generated by participants are much less frequently used. While analyses
of this type are often time-consuming and challenging to conduct, they may reveal
important information (such as variation in the type of content generated) that
cannot be as effectively captured through self-reports. Alternatively, using a
different emotional induction method, for example a rigged team-player game
where participants are led to believe that either they were primarily responsible
for the team loss (i.e., guilt) or team win (i.e., pride), could better standardize the
emotions induced and ensure consistency across participant experiences.
This study also differed from the original Kouchaki et al. (2014) study in
that it used a unique risk-taking task. The structure of the task was similar in that
it required participants to choose between a sure financial choice or a riskier,
uncertain financial choice, yet the gambling task used here was longer (32 trials
versus four trials) and more complex (incorporating both gain-framed and loss-
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framed trials). One concern in using a longer task is that it was unknown how
long the incidental emotion induced by the recall task would last. It is possible
that the carryover effects of the emotion induction faded more quickly than
anticipated, and therefore perhaps only the first trials of the task were influenced
by lingering emotion.
Future research should address these limitations by evaluating the
relationship between emotion and risk-taking using a wider variety of emotioninduction techniques and risk-taking assessments. Differences in sampling
populations should also be considered as there may have been unknown, inherent
differences between the university sample used in this study and those tested in
earlier research. Expanding beyond a university sample would be beneficial in
testing the strength of the relationship previously found and determining the
generalizability of the results.
Future investigations should also empirically explore the anecdotal
differences observed in this study between pride experiences characterized by
actions performed by the self versus actions performed by other people. The
extent to which it is important to distinguish between these two types of pride
experiences is unknown, as are their potential differential effects on general
decision-making. Results from the current study suggest that there may be more
diversity in the types of pride experiences participants recall, and that other
people may be perceived as more agentic in pride experiences than earlier
research suggests (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
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In summary, the influence of incidental emotion on risky decision-making
in everyday life remains an important research question. Understanding the
mechanisms through which specific affective experiences can intensify or inhibit
risk-taking can benefit our ability to anticipate people’s decision-making and help
them avoid extreme consequences by making more informed choices. The
current research confirms that emotional experiences are characterized by specific
environmental appraisal patterns, although the specific effect of control appraisals
on risk-taking remains inconclusive. Future research should consider the
limitations discussed above and continue to evaluate the extent to which
perceptions of control lead to greater risk-taking, as well as consider the
conditions under which this relationship may not be found.
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Appendix A
Sona Recruitment Ad
In this research study, you will be asked to respond to a short autobiographical
prompt and answer some general questions about your life and personal beliefs.
You will then play a short decision-making game. You will also be asked to
provide basic demographic information (e.g., gender, race, age). The study will
take approximately 30 minutes, to be completed in lab 990 W. Fullerton, room
109. You will earn 1 psychology pool credit for your participation.
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Appendix B
Emotion Induction Writing Prompt
Pride/Guilt/Sadness Conditions
Please describe a time in your personal life where you behaved in a way
that made you feel [insert emotion]. Please describe the details about this
situation that made you feel [insert emotion]. What was it like to be in
this situation? What thoughts and feelings did you experience? Describe
the situation and any thoughts or feelings you experienced. Please provide
as many details as possible so that a person reading your entry would
understand the situation and how you felt.
Please note: This question should take about 5 minutes of your time.
Neutral Condition
Please describe a typical day in your life. Provide as many details as
possible so that a person reading your entry would be able to clearly
picture your day. Try to make your report of your activities as factual and
objective as possible, and make sure to describe the what, where, and
when of your daily schedule.
Please note: This question should take about 5 minutes of your time.
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Appendix C
Emotion Appraisal Questions
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Appendix D
Illusory Control Measure
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Appendix E
Number Guessing Game

(next page)

(next page)
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Appendix F
Gambling Task Instructions

(next page)
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Appendix G
Sample of Gambling Task Trial
The amount participants received on the trial (see top slide) varied between $25,
$50, $75, or $100. The left option (see second slide) always reflects retaining an
amount that is one-fifth of the amount received, but alternates between being
phrased in terms of loss (“Lose $20”) versus gain (“Keep $80”). The probability
of winning the gamble to keep the full amount of what was received (see right
option) varied between 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%.
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Appendix H
Demographics
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Table 1
Demographics
Demographic Variable

n

Percentage M

Age

19.81

Gender
Female
Male
Other

103
45
1

69%
30%
1%

Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
Black
Asian
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
American Indian/Alaskan Native

78
33
22
13
1
2

52%
22%
15%
9%
1%
1%

School Year
Freshmen
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

69
38
30
12

46%
26%
20%
8%

Note: Total n = 149

SD
3.28
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Table 2
Demographics After Removing Neutral Condition
Demographic Variable
Age

n

Percentage M
19.85

78
34

70%
30%

Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
Black
Asian
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
American Indian/Alaskan Native

58
24
18
9
1
2

52%
21%
16%
8%
1%
2%

School Year
Freshmen
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

52
28
21
11

46%
25%
19%
10%

Gender
Female
Male
Other

Note: Total N = 112

SD
3.64
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Table 3
Intensity of Emotions Within Conditions
Item
How much pride did you feel?

Condition
Pride
Guilt
Sadness
Neutral

M
6.37
1.46
1.54
4.08

SD
1.32
1.12
1.07
1.72

How much guilt did you feel?

Pride
Guilt
Sadness
Neutral

1.82
6.34
4.31
1.65

1.63
0.94
2.04
1.16

How much sadness did you feel?

Pride
Guilt
Sadness
Neutral

2.24
5.29
6.36
2.16

1.65
1.47
0.93
1.52

Note: Items scored on a 7-point Likert scale.
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Table 4
Means for Emotion Appraisals
Appraisal
Pleasantness

Condition
Pride
Guilt
Sadness

M
5.76
1.97
1.64

SD
1.53
1.25
1.35

Agency of Self

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

5.34
6.14
4.54

1.99
1.38
2.10

Agency of Others

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

4.42
2.66
3.59

2.06
1.47
2.12

Agency of Chance

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

3.05
3.83
4.15

1.82
2.11
2.28

Personal Control

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

5.09
4.74
3.44

1.99
1.96
2.11

Anticipated Effort

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

5.95
4.91
4.90

1.59
1.84
2.01

Note: Items scored on a 7-point Likert scale.
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Table 5
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Pride

Table 6
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Guilt

Table 7
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Intensity of Sadness

Table 8
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Personal Control
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Table 9
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Pleasantness

Table 10
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Self

Table 11
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Others

Table 12
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Agency of Chance
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Table 13
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Comparison for Anticipated Effort

Table 14
Means for Illusory Control Measures
Measure
Illusory Control Scale

Condition
Pride
Guilt
Sadness

M
3.68
3.61
3.57

SD
1.19
1.16
1.18

Number Guessing Game

Pride
Guilt
Sadness

2.74
3.09
3.08

1.54
1.74
1.68

Note: Total N = 112
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Table 15
Gambling Percentages within Emotion Conditions
Percentage of Gambles

Condition

M

SD

Total

Pride

56%

15.4%

Guilt

59%

17.0%

Sadness

53%

16.8%

Pride

64%

17.6%

Guilt

69%

20.5%

Sadness

61%

19.8%

Pride

49%

19.0%

Guilt

49%

17.4%

Sadness

46%

19.7%

Under Loss Frame

Under Gain Frame

Note: Total N = 112

